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The Conditionality of the Trade-off between Government Responsiveness and Effectiveness:  
The Impact of Minority Status and Polls in the Canadian House of Commons 
 
Abstract 
There is an extensive literature on the relative virtues of different electoral systems in producing 
more responsive and effective governments, but far less attention has been paid to role of dynamic 
factors. This article examines how government minority/majority status and popularity shape the 
trade-off between government responsiveness and effectiveness. We argue that minority 
governments face legislative constraints that incentivize them to be responsive to the public, but that 
this comes at the expense of legislative effectiveness. This trade-off between responsiveness and 
effectiveness is, however, conditioned by the government’s standing in the polls. The more popular a 
minority government is in the polls, the less responsive and the more effective it becomes. These 
propositions are tested using original time-series data on public policy preferences, government 
popularity, legislative output and public expenditures in Canada from 1958 to 2009. Our findings 
demonstrate that minority governments are more responsive to the median voter but less 
legislatively effective than majority governments, and that these effects are moderated by the 
popularity of the government.  
 
Key words:  minority governments, representation, polls, responsiveness, effectiveness, Canada 
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Introduction 
The relative merits of consensus and majoritarian democracies have been debated extensively (see 
e.g. Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). A key element of this debate is the 
argument that consensus democracies with institutions of proportional representation tend to create 
greater incentives for responsiveness than majoritarian systems with plurality electoral systems (e.g. 
Powell 2000), while at the same time reducing the government's legislative effectiveness (e.g. Lowell 
1896). Conversely, majoritarian systems are considered more effective but provide fewer incentives 
for responsiveness. This suggests a trade-off between responsiveness and effectiveness. Others 
disagree that such a trade-off exists, either arguing that majoritarian systems provide greater 
incentives for responsiveness (Pearson and Tabellini 2004, Norris 1997) or that proportional systems 
do not necessarily hinder effectiveness (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Hence, disagreement persists in 
the literature as to how institutions conditions government responsiveness and effectiveness. 
Moreover, most studies have focused on differences between different electoral systems and 
neglected variation in responsiveness and effectiveness within systems. 
This article contributes to this debate on the trade-off between responsiveness and legislative 
effectiveness by examining the role of dynamic institutions, notably the government’s 
minority/majority status and popularity.  Hence, in contrast to most of the existing literature, we 
examine the effect of contextual factors that change regularly on government responsiveness and 
effectiveness. We argue that a government’s incentives and abilities to respond to citizens’ 
preferences and enact legislation in parliamentary systems are crucially determined by whether it 
currently holds a majority in the legislature as well as its prospects of controlling a legislative majority 
after the next election. Minority governments are expected to be more responsive to the median 
voter than majority governments, as they need to appeal to the median voter and the median 
legislator, in order pass legislation in parliament. At the same time, though, minority governments will 
be less effective at passing legislation. However, this trade-off between effectiveness and 
responsiveness is conditioned by the government’s standing in the polls. The more popular a minority 
government is in the polls, the less responsive and the more effective it becomes, until it behaves 
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much like a majority government. In fact, that point occurs once a minority government's standings in 
the polls suggests it could form a majority if an election were held. 
These propositions are tested using unique time-series data from Canada in the period from 1958 to 
2009. Canada makes an excellent case to test our propositions for three reasons. First, minority 
governments are common in Canada at the federal level. Almost half of the sessions of the Canadian 
Federal Parliament over the last half-century have had minority governments. Second, the lack of 
coalition governments in Canada simplifies the analysis by allowing for a clear distinction between 
majorities with full control and minorities that are dependent on the house at large, with no 
intermediate category that relies on more complex coalitional logic.  Third, Canada is considered to 
have one of the most majoritarian electoral systems (Lijphart 1999). It thus provides a test of the 
trade-off between responsiveness and legislative effectiveness under extreme circumstances. 
Our analysis of government responsiveness and effectiveness in the post-war period in Canada makes 
a number of contributions to the literature.  First, we are focusing on the conditioning influence of 
dynamic factors rather than static one. We can appropriately study their influence on responsiveness 
and effectiveness over time within a single country and thereby avoid making erroneous inferences 
due to confounding factors in a static cross-national study. Second, we utilize a new measure of the 
preferences of the governing party’s electoral base, so that we can estimate the responsiveness of the 
government to the median voter relative to their party base. Third, we go further than past studies on 
responsiveness in modeling the equilibrium between public opinion and government policy, allowing 
us to estimate both long-term and short-term responsiveness.  
This article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the literature on responsiveness and effectiveness, 
with a specific focus on the conditions that lead to variations in both. Thereafter, we present a simple 
theoretical model of why government minority/majority status and popularity shape responsiveness 
and legislative effectiveness and derive our hypotheses. We then examine whether the levels of social 
policy implemented by governments over time reflect the changing salience of social policy in the 
electorate (policy responsiveness) and the government's ability to pass into legislation the bills it 
tables in Parliament (legislative effectiveness), and how this is moderated by government status and 
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standing in the polls. We find support for our propositions concerning the effect of government status 
and standing in the polls. The concluding section discusses the implications of our results. 
  
Government responsiveness and effectiveness 
In an ideal world, we would design institutions that ensure that governments are both responsive to 
the preferences of citizens and effective in implementing their policy programme. Scholars have long 
debated whether consensus democracies, characterized by proportional representation (PR) and 
power-sharing executives, are preferable to majoritarian democracies characterized by plurality 
electoral rule and concentration of executive power (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Much of the debate 
has focused on how relatively static institutions, notably electoral rules (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000; 
Rogowski and Kayser 2002), shape government effectiveness and responsiveness. It is commonly 
argued that there is a trade-off between the government effectiveness that characterizes single-party 
majority governments produced by plurality elections, and representation of voters’ views and 
preferences seen in systems with proportional representation (Lijphart 1999: 258). However, the 
extant literature presents rather mixed evidence about the effect of electoral institutions. 
Looking first at government effectiveness, it is conventional wisdom that the majoritarian model with 
its emphasis on majority rule and concentration of power produces more effective government. For 
proponents of the majoritarian model, a key virtue of this system is that it tends to produce “strong” 
single-party governments, with a majority of parliamentary seats, which are able to implement their 
manifesto policies without the need to engage in post-election negotiations with coalition partners. 
Election results are decisive for government formation. Cabinet government can pass whatever 
legislation they feel is necessary during their term of office, so long as they can carry their own 
parliamentarians with them. Legislative effectiveness is enhanced by the exaggerative bias in the 
electoral system which rewards the winner with a bonus of seats. A "manufactured majority" is 
created by translating a relatively small lead in votes into a larger lead of seats in parliament (see 
Norris 1997).  
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Some have argued that the effectiveness of governments in majoritarian systems comes at the 
expense of responsive government, and proportional systems and coalitions governments provide 
higher ideological congruence between the public and governments (Lijphart 1984, 1999; Powell 
2000). In other words, there is a trade-off between the two virtues of government. Others argue that 
plurality systems and majoritarian governments promote the link between the preferences of voters 
and the positions and policies of governments (see Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Cox 1997; Persson 
and Tabellini 2004). Generally, there has been conflicting arguments and evidence about whether 
majoritarian or proportional systems results in the most responsive governments. 
On the one hand, majoritarian systems, such as first-past-the-post, have been argued to be highly 
responsiveness to voter preferences, since in a competitive two-party system a small swing in the 
popular vote is sufficient to bring the opposition into office. In such a system, where a relatively 
modest change in electoral preferences produces disproportionate changes in power, governments 
should be highly responsive to voter preferences (Norris 1997; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Cox 
1997, Persson and Tabellini, 2004). Because shifts in public preferences have bigger consequences on 
election day in plurality systems, governments are likely to pay closer attention to changes in public 
opinion. There should also be greater incentive for constituency service in single-member districts 
than in large multi-member constituencies. Furthermore, scholars examining the effect of institutions 
on the degree of responsiveness in between elections have argued that majoritarian systems with 
strong governments enhance clarity of responsibility. This makes it easier for voters to identify 
politicians that shirk and this should encourage governments to be more responsive to public 
preferences (Anderson 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). If clarity of responsibility conditions the 
extent to which voters can sanction governments, then such institutions should also be an important 
moderator of responsiveness, since governments that are held more to account should be more 
motivated to adjust policies in line with public preferences. As Soroka and Wlezien (2010: 48) note 
‘during the periods between elections, there are good reasons to think that governments in 
majoritarian systems actually are more responsive’.  
On the other hand, proponents of proportional systems have argued that such systems are more 
conducive to representative and responsive government (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Evidence 
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suggests that proportional systems produce governments with positions closer to the median voter 
(see e.g. Powell 2000).  According to Powell (2000, 2004) a balanced nationally-oriented party system 
where parties win roughly consistent vote shares from one contest to the next provides information 
helpful in bargaining and hence aids responsiveness. Also, while plurality systems may produce 
responsive governments when there is a delicate balance between the two parties in a two-party 
system, in reality such systems often produce one-party governments with a large parliamentary 
majority which makes them less vulnerable to public pressure during its term in office, and 
consequently less responsive to public mood swings and preferences than a government in a 
proportional system.  Moreover, large parties can survive significant reversals of voter approval in the 
plurality system, as long as no majority forms to remove them (which is often highly unlikely in so-
called ‘safe’ constituencies). Hence, the electoral removal sanction becomes less credible as the size 
(and majority) of the governing party increases in a majoritarian democracy and governments will 
tend not to be preoccupied with opinion change before it reaches a level where the opposition is in a 
position to threaten the government. In this regard, PR has an advantage in terms of sanctions 
because there are more candidates in each constituency with a reasonable chance of gaining 
representation (Lijphart 1999:162).  
We know from the few comparative studies of government responsiveness that government 
responsiveness between elections is weaker in the majoritarian Canada and the UK compared to the 
US. Soroka and Wlezien argue that this is because the parliamentary legislatures of Canada and the 
UK have a lower capacity to check the power of the executive than Congress has on the President in 
the US. Responsiveness is lower in the parliamentary systems because prime ministers and cabinet 
members exhibit more discretion in different policy areas (Soroka and Wlezien 2010: 58). The logic is 
that executives that face fewer legislative constraints are less responsive. This runs counter to the 
classic expectation that the greater legislative capacity in the US to check the executive and therefore 
the lower clarity of responsibility will reduce responsiveness relative to Canada and the UK. Similarly, 
Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) find that responsiveness between elections is weaker in the UK, 
where clarity of responsibility is high, compared with Denmark and the US, where clarity of 
responsibility is far lower due to the predominance of minority governments (Denmark) and divided 
government (US). Hobolt and Klemmensen argue that the harder the competitive struggle for votes 
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and policies, the more likely executives are to pander to public preferences and the less opportunity 
governments have to pursue their own interests. These findings suggest that governments facing 
greater pressures inside the legislature (legislative constraints) may in fact be more responsive to the 
median voter.  
These debates suggest that it is not sufficient simply to look at the contrast between two general 
models of democracy (consensus and majoritarian)  or two clusters of electoral systems (proportional 
and plurality) to understand when and why governments are more effective and responsive. 
Importantly, there may be changing factors within such systems that incentivize and enable 
governments to be either more responsive or more effective. In this article, we focus on the effect of 
dynamic institutions rather than static ones. In particular we argue that the degree to which  
governments face legislative constraints (and this varies both within and between systems) influence 
how responsive they are to public preferences. Governments with greater legislative constraints, 
notably minority government, are more responsive to changes in public preferences when 
formulating policies than governments that face lesser constraints, because they will seek to 
formulate policies that appeal to the median voter in order to secure public approval and therefore 
the legislative support that is necessary to pass a policy programme.  This is in line with work on the 
US president by Canes-Wrone. She has argued that since the president always needs the support of 
Congress to pass legislation, and often faces a Congress dominated by the opposition party, public 
appeals are an essential element of presidential power (Canes-Wrone 2006), and the outcome is that 
under such legislative constraints the policy outcomes are closer to the preferences of the electorates 
than when the executive faces no legislative constraints.  Just like US presidents, many executives in 
parliamentary systems also face institutional constraints, notably minority governments that do not 
control a majority of seats in the legislature (Hobolt and Karp 2010). These institutional constraints 
make it necessary for different parties to cooperate in order to pass legislation, and this is more likely 
to occur when the government can demonstrate to the other parties involved that it carries public 
opinion. In each of these cases, institutional constraints place pressure on governments to pursue 
popular policies in order to pass legislation.  
9 
 
We further argue that a government's standing in public opinion polls shape its incentives to respond 
to the median voter, since politicians who feel safe from electoral punishment because of their 
popularity in the polls will be less incentivized to respond to the median voter and instead feel free to 
pursue partisan interests. As Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson (1995: 544) state: ‘Politicians create an 
appropriate margin of safety: those who highly value policy formulation or who feel safe at home 
choose policy over security; those who face competitive challenge in the next election lean towards 
‘‘expediency’’ over security’. Similarly Canes-Wrone (2006) has argued that a ‘highly popular 
president will not pander’ (119) – ‘the only presidents who do so are the marginally popular ones’ 
since ‘...the increase in approval the incumbent receives from promoting a popular policy makes him 
likely to win reelection’ (121, see also Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004). Incumbents are thus expected 
to modify their policy behavior more when they fear for their survival than when they feel safe. This 
'margin of safety' or electoral uncertainly can be operationalized by measuring government popularity 
in the polls (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010). Moreover, the two conditioning 
factors – minority status and government popularity – are interdependent. When experiencing 
legislative constraints, the government requires popularity to pass legislation. Therefore, unpopular 
minority governments will be especially interested in gaining popularity by pursuing popular policies. 
In contrast, popular majority governments can more safely ignore the median voter and pursue more 
narrowly partisan policies. This argument is presented more formally in the next section. 
 
A Simple Model of the Conditionality of Government Responsiveness and Effectiveness 
The focus of our theoretical argument is the extent to which governments in parliamentary systems – 
facing different legislative constraints (due to minority/majority status) and ratings in the polls – will 
respond to the changing preferences of the median voter when developing their policy programs and 
passing legislation.  
For the sake of simplicity, we illustrate our argument focusing on just two parties: the governing party 
(GP); and the opposition party (OP) on a single dimension. The assumption of our model is that for 
ideological, strategic or policy-seeking reasons, the governing party would like to pass legislation and 
enact policy that is in line with its core voters – its party base (see Cox, 1984; Persson and Tabellini, 
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2004) – but that its primary objective is to return to office (Downs 1957). Party supporters offer 
scarce resources, such as active campaign participation and party donations, that the governing party 
leadership may be dependent upon (see e.g. Kitschelt 1988; Miller and Schofield 2003; Panebianco 
1989). Moreover, the preferences of the partisan base are likely to reflect the policy objectives of 
parties more accurately than the average voter. Hence, unlike most studies of responsiveness, we 
consider the potential trade-off that governments face between appealing to the median voter and 
following the preferences of their partisan base.1 The governing party has the choice of proposing 
policy that falls along a particular policy spectrum. On this particular policy spectrum, the preference 
of the median voter (MV) falls between the preferences of the governing and opposition parties. For 
our purposes, we will consider the spectrum to represent more or less policy on a particular issue. 
MORE <-----------------GP--------------------------------MV------------------------------------OP---------------------------> LESS  
The opposition party has the choice of supporting or opposing the policy proposed by the 
government. Both parties take into account whether the government is a majority or minority (MIN) 
as well as  the governing party’s current standing in the polls(P). 
We are interested in estimating 1) the responsiveness of the government to the median voter relative 
to its base, and 2) the effectiveness of the government at passing legislation, given the popularity of 
the governing party in the polls(P) and the governments majority/minority status(MIN). 
We begin by considering a majority government. If the governing party is doing well in the polls, well 
above the threshold to form a majority government in an election, we can expect the governing party 
to propose policy that falls in line with (is very close to) the preference of its base (GP). For our 
specific purposes, the threshold in Canada is generally considered to be 40 per cent2 We also expect 
                                                          
1
 Recent empirical research has focused on the extent to which some types of parties are responsive to party supporters 
rather than median voters.  Adams et al. (2006) and Ezrow et al. (2010) show that niche parties (i.e. parties belonging to 
the Communist, Nationalist and Green party families) are highly sensitive to shifts in the position of their mean supporter, 
while they do not respond systematically to the median voter in the general electorate. 
2
 Since the World Wars, the lowest percentage of the popular vote that led to a majority government was received by the 
Liberal party under Jean Chrétien in 1997. The Liberals formed a majority government with only 38.46 percent of the vote. 
An almost identical results (in terms of the popular vote) -- 38.42 percent -- earned the Liberal party under Pierre Trudeau 
in 1972 a minority government. In fact, the Liberal party under Lester B. Pearson only received minority governments in 
1963 and 1965 with popular votes in the 40 to 42 percent range. The current Stephen Harper majority was earned with 
39.62 percent of the popular vote. 
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such a government to be highly effective at passing its legislation. The opposition party may be 
motivated to oppose the policy change but will not be in a position to block it, so it will be 
implemented.  
As we consider the situation with decreasing levels of popularity in the polls for the majority 
governing party, we would expect the policy proposed by the governing party to shift somewhat 
towards that of the median voter(MV). This shift would be motivated by the governing party’s desire 
to appeal to the median voter and to improve its standing in the polls. This in turn is motivated by the 
anticipation of a future election. Depending on how close the policy is to the wishes of the median 
voter, the opposition party may be more or less motivated to oppose the policy change but again, 
they will not be in a position to block the policy. The government will continue to be highly effective 
at passing its legislation, although its legislation may be more in line with the wishes of the median 
voter than it would be under a more popular majority government. 
Next we consider a minority government. If it is doing very well in the polls, the governing party can 
propose policy close to that of its party base. It can do this because it knows that the opposition party 
will hesitate to oppose the policy and force an election which it would likely lose (possibly resulting in 
the governing party gaining a majority). For this reason, the legislative effectiveness of such a minority 
government will likely be about as high as that of a majority government. However, implemented 
policy may be somewhat closer to the median voter than a majority government in the same situation 
as the governing party will need to propose and implement policy that appeals to the median voter in 
order to retain its position in the polls (which is much more important than it is under a majority 
government). 
Under a minority government that is doing less well in the polls, the governing party will have to shift 
this policy even further in the direction of the median voter, both in order to improve its standing in 
the polls and to be able to put the opposition party in a position that it will be unlikely to oppose the 
policy. As this minority government will not want to risk forcing an election, they are likely only to 
propose legislation that the opposition will not oppose. There is also the more short-term concern 
namely that the government needs an actual legislative majority to support the legislation for it to get 
passed. Hence, policies closer to the median voter under minority governments may also be the 
12 
 
function of governments reaching out to a broader based coalition in parliament. Given the need for 
support from the opposition party to pass legislation, the legislative effectiveness of such a minority 
government will be lower than that of a majority government or a more popular minority 
government. 
This theoretical model is summarized in Figure 1. This figure suggests that the level of policy is a 
function of both the preferences of the governing party base and the median voter. The extent to 
which the governing party responds to the median voter, rather than its party base, is a function of 
whether the governing party controls a majority in parliament. Minority governments will be more 
responsive. As for legislative effectiveness, this too will be a function of majority status. Minority 
governments will be less effective. Hence, the trade-off. Further, the sensitivity of the governing 
party’s responsiveness and effectiveness to being a minority government will be a function of the 
polls. As the governing party’s popularity increases, a minority government’s responsiveness 
decreases while its effectiveness increases. At the point that the polls suggests the governing party 
could form a majority if an election were held (40 per centin Canada), the minority government 
should be about as responsive and effective as a majority government – although it may still retain a 
degree of responsiveness above that of majority government. The responsiveness of a majority 
government to the median voter relative to the party base may also, to a lesser degree, be a function 
of the governing party’s popularity in the polls. 
-- Figure 1 -- 
The theoretical model also includes whether it is an election year and the party in government as 
predictors of government policy response and it includes the party in government as a predictor of 
legislative effectiveness 
Based on this theoretical model, we can formulate the following hypotheses. For reasons explained 
below, we reformulate the hypotheses with respect to the mean, rather than the median voter. 
H1: Compared to majority governments, minority governments produce policies that are more 
responsive to the preferences of the mean voter, relative to those of their partisan base.  
H2: Compared to majority governments, minority governments are less legislatively effective.  
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H3: The effect of being a minority government on responsiveness to the mean voter and legislative 
effectiveness (relative to a majority government) will decline as the governing party’s popularity in 
the polls increases. 
The implication of H3 is that once a minority government reaches sufficiently high levels of support in 
the polls to suggest it could form a majority government, it exhibits about the same levels of 
responsiveness and legislative effectiveness as a majority government. 
 
The Data  
This article tests two hypotheses regarding the impact of minority government on democratic 
responsiveness (H1, H3), and two hypotheses regarding the impact of minority government on 
legislative effectiveness (H2, H3). 
The dependent variable when estimating government responsiveness is policy output. This is 
measured by program expenditures of the federal government during the same period. Expenditures 
are measured in billions of 2002 Canadian dollars.3 We rely on government expenditures as an 
indicator of the resources the government is willing to allocate to a particular policy and we focus on 
voter preferences and consolidated government expenditures on social welfare programs.4 We 
choose social welfare expenditures because it is a core component of government spending and past 
work has determined that Canadian government responsiveness in this area is generally high (Soroka 
and the Wlezien 2004, 2010). Also, our period of study covers the bulk of the period in which the 
social welfare state in Canada was developed and partially retrenched – although in terms of 
expenditures, the retrenchment has really just been a reduction in the speed of expansion. Yearly 
expenditures on social welfare programs during each parliamentary session are plotted in Figure 2.  
– Figure 2 – 
                                                          
3
 Expenditure data comes from four Statistics Canada sources: Terminated CANSIM Matrix 2780 (data range: 1965-1996), 
CANSIM I Series D44950 (data range: 1933-1969), CANSIM table 3850001 (data range: 1989-2009), and the publication 
“Historical Statistics of Canada” by Richard M. Bird (1999) (data range: 1965-1975). After converting all dollar amounts 
into 2002 Canadian dollars, these sources were spliced together. There is a great deal of overlap between them and so the 
average proportional difference between each series was calculated and used to adjust each to the scale of the most 
recent series.  
4
 By consolidated, we mean across the federal, provincial, territorial, and local governments.  
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Governments can be responsive both in terms of adjusting their issue positions (i.e. higher or lower 
taxes) and by changing their issue priorities (i.e. the social services is a higher priority than military 
spending) in line with public preferences. We focus on the latter type of responsiveness, i.e. we 
examine whether government spending on social welfare reflects the issue priorities of the mean 
voter relative to the preferences of the governing party's electoral base (see Hobolt and Klemmensen 
2008). As an indicator of public preferences for spending on social welfare programs, we use a 
measure of relative priority of this issue over others, analyzing responses to what is known as the 
most important problem/issue question. These are (usually) open-ended questions asking 
respondents a question such as: “What do you think is the most important issue/problem facing 
Canada today?” Some variant of this question has been included consistently in polls and the election 
studies throughout the period of our analysis. Importantly, it provides a measure of issue salience 
relative to all other issues, as each respondent can only provide one answer. We proceed by 
combining survey data from the Canadian election studies and 85 commercial polls to estimate the 
policy preferences of the Liberal and (Progressive) Conservative party bases,5 and those of the mean 
voter. This is done for the 1965 to 2009 period. The unit of analysis is the parliamentary session, 
which are approximately, but not entirely, yearly. 
A potential source of measurement error comes from the likely possibility that some part of the over 
time change in issue priority reflects a change in salience rather than actual priority (Wlezien 2005). 
However, to the extent that there are differences between the base of the governing party and the 
mean voter, these differences reflect differences in priorities. Social welfare as a priority clearly 
relates to a set of policies. Therefore, the extent to which the mean voter identifies social welfare as 
the most important problem more often than the base of the governing party in large part reflects the 
differing policy priorities of the mean voter. Further, the identification of social welfare as an 
important issue typically means a preference for more spending. Reductions in spending are given a 
different code. It is possible a respondent may prefer a reduction in spending and not be clear about 
it in his/her response. This is a potential source of measurement error. 
                                                          
5
 These being the only parties that have formed government in Canada over the time period we study. 
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Our empirical strategy requires measures of social welfare as a policy priority for the mean voter and 
each governing party base. There are a number of potential ways to define a party base, in order to 
examine their issue priorities, but we cannot simply use the opinions of those that indicate they 
would vote for the party in each survey. The reason this is problematic is that as a party becomes 
more/less popular over time, more/less individuals will indicate they will vote for it. This will result in 
a change in the opinions of this group, not necessarily because any individual changed their opinion, 
but simply because the composition of the group has changed. To a lesser extent, the same problem 
applies to simply using voters’ stated identification with a party in each poll.  
For these reasons we define a party base socio-demographically. Specifically, we mean those 
Canadians who are most likely to vote for that party as measured by their socio-demographic 
characteristics. The mean voter is similarly defined by a socio-demographic profile.  This approach 
allows us to hold the composition of the base, or mean voter, consistent over the electoral cycle, 
while measuring how each group’s issue priorities change. This process is detailed below. 
For each electoral cycle we measure the demographic characteristics of the party base – for each 
party that has governed – from the Canadian Election Study conducted during the election that 
preceded the electoral cycle. We then use these demographic profiles to estimate the opinions of the 
base for each party, using the commercial polls conducted throughout the electoral cycle. In other 
words, we hold the composition of each party's base constant and then estimate the changing 
opinions of these groups over time. At the beginning of a new electoral cycle, the demographics for 
each party are reassessed, based on the vote intentions of the respondents in the new election study. 
For example a poll conducted in the period between the 2000 and 2004 elections would use the 
demographics of a core constituent in the 2000 election. This allows for the real possibility that the 
composition of the base for each party might change from one electoral cycle to the next. 
Our full procedure is provided in Appendix A.6 The result is that we have an estimate of the 
proportion of each party's base that are predicted to indicate each issue as the most important at 
                                                          
6
 In brief, demographic variables are commonly recoded across all data sets (polls and elections studies) within the 
electoral cycle. Then, for each poll a penalized logit model is fit for each issue with these demographic variables. Each 
demographic profile can then be entered as the covariate values in each model to produce the predicted probability that a 
member of any particular demographic group lists the issue as their top priority. 
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various points in time (99 different months) over the 44 year period. In other words, for each party 
and each issue we have a time series of relative issue priorities for a full range of issues.7 
As we did not have polls for every month in this time period, we have a monthly time series with 
missing values. The estimates and their standard errors were input into a Bayesian Kalman filter 
(Green, Gerber, and De Boef. 1999; Jackman 2009, Chapter 9) to produce a smoothed time series that 
both reduced the uncertainty in the estimates and interpolated values for the months without 
estimates.8 The monthly interpolated values are then averaged over each Parliamentary session:  32 
in total. This gives us the average proportion of each governing party’s base that identified each issue 
as the most important issue during each Parliamentary session, from 1965 to 2009. For the study, we 
use the proportion that identified social welfare programs. 
Using this same procedure, we also create a demographic profile of the average voter and estimate 
their relative issue priorities, and impute a full monthly time series in the same manner. This data is 
used to represent the mean voter. We choose to estimate the priorities of the average (mean) voter, 
rather than the median voter, as the response categories for some of the demographic variables have 
a limited number of categories. The result is that the demographic profile of the median voter 
changes in surges, while the demographic profile of the mean voter does not. Figure 3 plots the 
imputed portion of the governing party base (GP), and the difference between this and the 
proportion for the mean of all voters (MV − GP) that indicated social welfare as the most important 
issue over time. As we see from the plot, there certainly is a fair amount of common movement but 
there are also important differences that change over time 
– Figure 3 – 
                                                          
7
 Our use of demographic variables to estimate the issue priorities of the governing party base requires that the models 
used have a reasonably good fit – i.e., demographics are a good predictor of responses to the MIP question. Penalized 
logits are problematic to evaluate with standard goodness of fit measures but to evaluate the prediction accuracy of each 
penalized logit, one can estimate ROC curves. The web appendix to Pickup and Whelan (2014 ) contains a table of 
summary statistics for the ROC curves from the penalized logits used to predict Welfare being identified as the most 
important by the governing party base using demographics. Overall, the penalized logits perform well. The standard 
statistic used to assess ROC curves is the area under the curve, ranging from 0.5 (equivalent to chance alone) to 1 (perfect 
prediction). The mean over all surveys was 0.842, which is a moderately strong ROC value.  
8
 Interpolation estimates values of the time series for months that we do not have a poll using the poll information from 
months preceding and following the months without polls. We also have a temporal overlap between Gallup and 
Environics polls, which we used to estimate and control for systematic (constant) differences in polls from the two firms. 
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The dependent variable when testing hypotheses regarding legislative effectiveness is the ability of 
the government to pass legislation that it deems important. This is measured as the proportion of bills 
the government moved past second-reading in the House of Commons that received Royal Assent, in 
each session.9 Our data cover the period extending from the beginning of the 24th Parliament to the 
end of the 40th. This includes 42 sessions of Parliament and spans the temporal period 1958 to 2008. 
The temporal unit of analysis is again the parliamentary session. We plot the legislative effectiveness 
in Figure 4. 
– Figure 4 – 
 
There are possibly two outliers. One of which (the 31st Parliament) was a result of a quickly defeated 
minority government. The inclusion of a minority variable in our empirical model (below) may account 
for this outlier. The other outlier (third session of the 37th Parliament) reflects the last session of a 
long-standing Prime Minister (Jean Chretien) and a high degree of infighting within the governing 
Liberal party over whether or not Chretien should resign. These outliers might cause issues with 
homoscedasticity, for which we will test. The plot of legislative effectiveness suggests there may be a 
systematic decline in legislative success in the later parliamentary sessions. This would be a non-linear 
trend that could be modelled with a quadratic function of time. It is possible that this is just an end 
effect – that is, there appears to be a trend at the end but if we were able to continue observing this 
series further in time we would see that it is just a temporary downward shift (Tufte 2001). Appendix 
B contains a test of this possible trend and determines that there is no evidence of it. Therefore, we 
do not include it in the empirical model (below). 
We also require measures of our conditioning variables - government popularity (P), minority status 
(MIN) – and our control variables: elections year (E), unemployment rate (U) and party in government 
(PG). Turning first to our conditioning variables,  the popularity of the governing party in the polls is 
                                                          
9
 Bills that do not pass second-reading are not considered. Bills were selected in this way because governing parties will 
sometimes introduce bills which they do not intend to pursue. There are a number of reasons why a governing party may 
do this. However, if the government pursues a bill past second reading in the House of Commons, one can be relatively 
certain that they are serious about passing it into law. 
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based on all vote intention polls published by major polling firms during each session of Parliament.10 
A typical vote intention question is: ‘If a federal election were held tomorrow, which party would you 
vote for?’ The measure of popularity is the average share of vote intention the governing party 
received in all polls published over each session. As for whether a government is a minority or a 
majority, a minority government is simply defined as any government in which the governing party 
has less than 50 per cent plus one of the seats in the House of Commons. The minority variable is 
coded 1 for minority governments and 0 for majority governments.  
As for our control variables, the governing party variable is coded: Liberals (1) or (Progressive) 
Conservatives (0). We also include an election year variable by creating an indicator variable that is 
coded 1 if a session ends with an election and 0 otherwise. When testing responsiveness, the 
unemployment rate controls for the real demand for welfare programs which determines, in part, 
values of the dependent variable, spending, but will also be expected to correlate with the priority 
placed on spending by voters.11  
 
The Empirical Models  
If we translate the theoretical model for responsiveness in Figure 1 into an empirical model, the result 
is a number of interactions: 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦~𝑓(ln(𝑃) , 𝑀𝐼𝑁, 𝐸, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝑃𝐺, 𝐺𝑃, (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃), ln(𝑃) × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃), ln(𝑃) × 𝑀𝐼𝑁, 𝑀𝐼𝑁
× (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃), ln(𝑃) × 𝑀𝐼𝑁 × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃)) 
In addition to the controls, this includes the interactions indicated in the theoretical model and all of 
the necessary constituent “main” effects. The GP term represents the estimated policy preferences of 
                                                          
10
 These polls were collected by the Polling Observatory. The polling firms include Angus Reid, Canadian Facts, Compas, 
Comquest Research, Decima, Ekos, Environics, Gallup, CROP, Insight Canada, Ipsos Reid, Leger, Nanos/SES, Pollara, 
Sorecom, Zogby, and Strategic Council. 
11
 The unemployment data are from the Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey, which has been conducted since 1945. The 
data are comprised of two time series. For years prior to 1976 Statistics Canada publishes annual labour force data as part 
of its series on historical statistics of Canada (http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectiond/4057750-eng.htm#2). 
These data are based on the average of 12 monthly Labour Force Survey's for each year. In 1976 the Labour Force Survey 
was redesigned to be a more extensive and rigorous survey (http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-
bmdi/document/3701_D7_T9_V1-eng.pdf). From this point onwards monthly data are available in Statistics Canada's 
CANSIM tables (http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?id=2820087). 
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the governing party base and the (MV − GP) term is the difference between these preferences and 
those of the mean voter. Through the two-way interaction terms, we can capture the expectation 
that this relative responsiveness is affected by the governing party’s standing in the polls: ln(P) ×
(MV − GP), and whether the governing party has a minority or majority: MIN × (MV − GP). Through 
a three-way interaction term, we capture the expectation that the effect of polls on this relative 
responsiveness of a minority governing party will depend on its standing in the polls: ln(P) × MIN ×
(MV − GP). We discuss how to interpret the estimated coefficients for these terms below. 
To allow for both short- and long-term effects, and to allow for the possibility that the data are 
cointegrated (which we test below), we choose to use an error correction model, with a trend in the 
first differences and a quadratic trend in the cointegrating equation: 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 = 𝜅0,0 + 𝜌1𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜅0,𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
Δ𝑋𝑡,𝑘 + 𝜅0,𝑘+1𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 − 𝜅1,0 + ∑ 𝜅1,𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑋𝑡,𝑘 − 𝜅1,𝑘+1𝑇
2 
Given that many of the interaction terms will exhibit collinearity and we have only 32 data points, we 
ran the model first without the interaction terms and then with the interactions. Therefore we test 
our hypotheses by breaking the model down into two separate empirical models. 
1) 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 = 𝜅0,0 + 𝜌1𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜅0,1Δ ln(𝑃)𝑡 + 𝜅0,2Δ𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝜅0,3Δ𝐸𝑡 + 𝜅0,4Δ𝐺𝑃𝑡 +
𝜅0,5Δ(𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃)𝑡 + 𝜅0,6Δ𝑈𝑡 + 𝜅0,7Δ𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝜅0,8𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 − 𝜅1,0 − 𝜅1,1 ln(𝑃)𝑡 − 𝜅1,2𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 − 𝜅1,3𝐸𝑡 − 𝜅1,4𝐺𝑃𝑡 − 𝜅1,5(𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃)𝑡
− 𝜅1,6𝑈𝑡 − 𝜅1,7𝑃𝐺𝑡 − 𝜅1,8𝑇
2 
 
2) 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 = 𝜅′0,0 + 𝜌′1𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡′𝑡−1 + 𝜅′0,1Δ ln(𝑃)𝑡 + 𝜅′0,2Δ𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝜅′0,3Δ𝐸𝑡 + 𝜅′0,4Δ𝐺𝑃𝑡 +
𝜅′0,5Δ(𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃)𝑡 + 𝜅′0,6Δ𝑈𝑡 + 𝜅′0,7Δ𝑃𝐺𝑡 + 𝜅′0,8Δ(ln(𝑃) × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃))𝑡 +
𝜅′0,9Δ(𝑀𝐼𝑁 × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃))𝑡 + 𝜅′0,10Δ(ln(𝑃) × 𝑀𝐼𝑁)𝑡 + 𝜅′0,11Δ(ln(𝑃) × 𝑀𝐼𝑁 ×
(𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃))
𝑡
+ 𝜅′0,12𝑇 + 𝜀′𝑡 
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𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡′𝑡 = 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,0 − 𝜅
′
1,1 ln(𝑃)𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,2𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,3𝐸𝑡 − 𝜅1,4𝐺𝑃𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,5(𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃)𝑡
− 𝜅′1,6𝑈𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,7𝑃𝐺𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,8(ln(𝑃) × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃))𝑡
− 𝜅′1,9(𝑀𝐼𝑁 × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃))𝑡 − 𝜅
′
1,10(ln(𝑃) × 𝑀𝐼𝑁)𝑡
− 𝜅′1,11(ln(𝑃) × 𝑀𝐼𝑁 × (𝑀𝑉 − 𝐺𝑃))𝑡 − 𝜅′1,12𝑇
2 
In each model, the first equation is the error correction equation and second equation is the 
cointegrating equation. The cointegrating equation models the long-run relationship between 
preferences and expenditures. The coefficients on the first differenced variables in the error 
correction equation represent the short-run effects of preferences on expenditures. The short-run 
effects are just the change in expenditures as a response to a change in preferences. The long-run 
effects need to be explained further. 
In an error correction model with cointegrated data, the cointegrating equation represents the 
cointegrating relationship between the variables. How is this interpreted? Expenditures are not 
stationary, so there is no equilibrium to which they will return in the absence of external shocks. This 
is true even after controlling for the trending in expenditures. However, because expenditures are 
cointegrated with preferences, another type of equilibrium does exist. This equilibrium is the 
weighted difference between expenditures and preferences. Even though expenditures may not 
return to any specific equilibrium level, they do tend to return to an equilibrium relative to 
preferences (the simplest example of such an equilibrium would be if expenditures returned to a 
constant proportion of preferences). When expenditures are out of equilibrium in that they are too 
high relative to preferences, they will tend to decrease until they reached their relative equilibrium. 
Equivalently, if expenditures are out of equilibrium in that they are too low relative to preferences, 
they will tend to increase until they reached their relative equilibrium. An error correction model 
estimates the equilibrium relationship through the coefficients in the cointegrating equation and 
estimates the rate at which expenditures return to their relative equilibrium by the coefficient on the 
(lag of the) cointegrating term in the error correction equation (𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−1). The necessary assumption 
to interpret these effects as causal is weak exogeneity (Enders 2004). Substantively this assumption is 
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that when expenditures and preferences are out of equilibrium, it is expenditures that change to re-
achieve equilibrium and not preferences. 
The first model tests the responsiveness of government policy to the preferences of the mean voter 
relative to the governing party base. The coefficient on (MV − GP) in the cointegrating equation 
represents the long-run responsiveness of the governing party to the mean voter relative to its party 
base, holding the preferences of the party base constant. In other words, this is the responsiveness of 
the governing party to the mean voter to the exclusion of the governing party base’s preferences. The 
coefficient on GP represents the responsiveness of the governing party to its base holding (MV − GP) 
constant. It is the response of the government to changes in the preferences of the governing party 
when those preferences move in tandem with the mean voter. The difference in the coefficients on 
GP and (MV − GP) represent the responsiveness of the government to the governing party base 
holding mean voter preferences constant. To see this, consider the following. If GP increases by 1 unit 
while MV remains constant, the change in (MV − GP) is -1. Therefore, the effect is the coefficient on 
GP minus the coefficient on (MV − GP). Note that for the preferences of the governing party base to 
increase while the preferences of the mean voter remain constant, requires the preferences of those 
not part of the governing party base to decrease. This will be important when interpreting our results. 
 If the government responds to the mean voter, irrespective of governing party preferences, we 
would expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on (MV − GP). If the government is 
responsive to its base, irrespective of mean voter preferences, we would expect the difference in the 
coefficients, for GP and (MV − GP) to be positive and statistically significant. Each of these 
expectations may also apply to the coefficients on the first differenced variables in the error 
correction equation. These represent the short-run effects: the immediate change in expenditures 
due to a change in preferences. 
The second model includes the two-way and three-way interactions discussed above. The interaction 
between (MV − GP) the preferences of the mean voter (relative to those of the governing party 
base) on the one hand and the popularity of the governing party in the polls on the other captures the 
extent to which the relative responsiveness of a majority government differs depending on the 
standing of the governing party in the polls. If unpopular majority governments are generally more 
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responsive to the mean voter (relative to their party base) we would expect this interaction term to 
be statistically significant and negative. We use the natural log of the popularity of the governing 
party in the polls, ln(𝑃), to capture some of the expected nonlinearity of these effects. 
The interaction between the preferences of the mean voter (relative to those of the governing party 
base) on the one hand and the status of the government as a minority government on the other 
allows the responsiveness of the government to the mean voter (relative to its party base) to differ 
depending on whether the government has a majority or minority. If minority governments are 
generally more responsive to the mean voter, relative to their party base, we would expect this 
interaction term to be statistically significant and positive. 
Finally, to test the sensitivity of mean voter responsiveness to polls for minority governments, we 
include the three-way interaction between the preferences of the mean voter (relative to those of the 
governing party base), the status of the government as a minority government, and the government 
popularity in the polls. If minority governments become less responsive as they gain popularity, we 
would expect this coefficient to be statistically significant and negative. 
These are general expectations regarding the signs and significance of the coefficients. Due to the 
complexity of the model, we will have to plot the estimated responsiveness of the both majority and 
minority governments to the mean voter and the party base at different levels of popularity. Before 
we turn to the results of our estimated responsiveness model, we outline the empirical model for 
legislative effectiveness. 
We include in our empirical model for legislative effectiveness: the minority government indicator 
variable, popularity in the polls, and an interaction between the two. We also include the square of 
poll popularity and its interaction with the minority indicator variable. This is done to account for 
nonlinearities in these effects.12 Finally, we include a control for the party in government.  
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑡
2𝑋𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
Having outlined our empirical models, we examine the results of estimating each. 
                                                          
12
 This produced a marginally better fit than using the log of poll popularity: 𝑅2 of 0.5106 vs 0.5075. 
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Results 
We are testing the hypotheses that minority governments produce policies that are more responsive 
to the preferences of the mean voter, relative to those of their partisan base but are less legislatively 
effective than majority governments (H1, H2). We are also testing the hypothesis that these effects of 
being a minority government will decline as the governing party’s popularity in the polls increases 
(H3). An implication of H3 is that once a minority government reaches sufficiently high levels of 
support in the polls to suggest it could form a majority government (40 percent in the Canadian case), 
it will exhibit about the same levels of responsiveness and legislative effectiveness as a majority 
government. 
Responsiveness Results 
Before we estimate an error correction model, we begin by testing whether government spending is 
cointegrated with the other variables in our model. The error correction model can be used for 
stationary or cointegrated data but the estimation technique used and interpretation will differ. We 
use the Johansen trace statistics to test for cointegration between government expenditures, the 
policy preferences of the governing party base, the differences in the policy preferences of the 
governing party base and the mean voter, government popularity and unemployment rates. The trace 
statistic indicates we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating equations.13 The trace statistic 
also indicates we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no more than one cointegrating equation.14 This 
indicates that the data are cointegrated with just one cointegrating equation, as assumed in our 
empirical model specification. 
The results for the two social welfare spending error correction models (each with one cointegrating 
equation) are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 contains the results for the cointegrating equations 
and Table 2 contains the results for the error correction equations. A third order moving average term 
is included in the cointegrating equations to remove serial correlation, necessitating a maximum 
                                                          
13
 Allowing for a quadratic trend, the trace statistic is 85.36 and the 5% critical value is 77.74. 
14
 Allowing for a quadratic trend, the trace statistic is 54.26 and the 5% critical value is 54.64. 
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likelihood estimation for this equation.15 With the inclusion of the third order moving average term, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are a white noise process using the 
Portmanteau Q test for either of the two models.16 The estimates for the error correction model are 
produced using OLS and the Granger two-step procedure (Wooldridge 2006). 
– Tables 1 and 2 – 
In the results for Model 1, we see that the coefficient on the difference in the preferences of the 
mean voter and the party base in the cointegrating equation is positive and statistically significant, at 
the 0.05 significance level. This is the long-run response of the mean voter, holding the governing 
party’s base constant. If the percentage of all voters indicating social welfare is the most important 
problem increases by one point, while the percentage for the party base remains constant, spending 
will be 4.1 billion dollars greater than it would be otherwise. To put this in perspective, the observed 
range of (MV − GP) is -1.15% to 2.26%. The responsiveness of the government to the party base, 
holding mean voter preferences constant is the difference between the coefficient on GP and 
(MV − GP). A Wald test indicates that the difference is not statistically significant at the 0.05 
significance level. The test statistic, which is chi-squared distributed with one degrees of freedom, is 
3.51. The corresponding P-value is 0.0611. 
These results are within the cointegrating equation. They indicate that there is an equilibrium 
relationship between government expenditures and mean voter preferences. For a full test of the 
long-term responsiveness of government expenditures to mean voter preferences, we must look at 
the results in table 2. The coefficient on the cointegration term in the error correction model indicates 
the rate at which government expenditures respond to mean voter preferences and government 
expenditures being out of equilibrium. For model one, the value is statistically significant and is -0.48. 
This gives the following interpretation. If mean voter preferences and government expenditures move 
out of equilibrium because mean voter preferences increased by one percentage point, the 
cointegration term will be -4.08 (this is the negative of the coefficient on relative mean voter 
                                                          
15
 Including a moving average term is not the ideal way of ensuring the correct standard errors in the cointegrating 
equation. Ideally we would use a lead-lag estimator (Wooldridge 2006). However, with so many covariates in the model 
and so few data points, a lead-lag estimator is impractical. 
16
 Model 1: Q-statistic is 18.13 and is chi-squared(14) distributed, with a corresponding P-value of 0.201. Model 2: Q-
statistic is 12.79 and is chi-squared(14) distributed, with a corresponding P-value of 0.543 
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preferences in the cointegrating equation). The result is that in the next time point, expenditures will 
increase by 48 percent of this amount (48 percent of 4.08 billion dollars), putting mean voter 
preferences and government expenditures closer to equilibrium. If nothing else occurs, expenditures 
will increase by 48 percent of the remaining difference in the next period and so on until equilibrium 
is achieved. 
To test our hypotheses, we need to move on to model 2. Looking just at the coefficients in the 
cointegrating equation (Table 1), we see that the coefficient on the interaction between minority 
government status and relative mean voter preferences is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that minority governments are more responsive to the mean voter than majority 
governments (H1). We also see that the three-way interaction between minority governments status, 
relative mean voter preferences and popularity is negative and statistically significant. This indicates 
that the greater responsiveness of minority governments to the mean voter decreases as the 
government becomes more popular (H3). To get a full sense of government responsiveness to both 
the mean voter and the party base, we need to predict responsiveness at different levels of 
popularity, for both majority and minority governments. 
Figure 5 plots the estimated long-run responsiveness of minority and majority governments to the 
mean voter, holding the preferences of the party base constant, at different levels of responsiveness. 
These are plotted over the observable range of popularity for minority and majority governments. We 
see that minority governments are certainly responsive to the mean voter and that this 
responsiveness declines as the government becomes more popular. The estimated level of popularity 
at which a minority government becomes equally responsive as a majority government is 39.20 
percent (95% confidence interval: 37.40, 41.01). This is notable because 40 percent is commonly 
considered in Canada to be the percent of the vote a federal party needs to achieve in order to form a 
majority government. This suggests that a minority government becomes equally responsive as a 
majority government when the poll suggests it could win a majority in an election. As for the 
responsiveness of a majority government (Figure 5), there is a small range around 40 percent in the 
polls that a majority government has a minor, positive level of responsiveness that is statistically 
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significant at the 0.05 significance level. Otherwise, the responsiveness does not really change with 
popularity. 
– Figure 5 – 
Moving on to the responsiveness of a majority and minority governments to the governing party base, 
holding mean voter preferences constant, we look at Figure 6. Here we see the responsiveness of 
minority governments to the party base is negative at low levels of popularity in the polls. This is 
when we need to remember that an increase in the expenditure preferences of the governing party’s 
base, holding the mean voter preferences constant, means that those outside the party base must 
have a decrease in expenditure preferences. This explains why at low levels of popularity, a minority 
government will respond to a relative increase in the preferences of its party’s base with a decrease in 
expenditures. The government is responding to the decrease in the expenditure pressures of those 
outside its base. As a minority government becomes more popular, in particular when it passes 40 
percent in the polls, its responsiveness is positive. This means that it responds to an increase in the 
relative expenditure preferences of its party base with an increase in expenditures even though those 
outside its base will have expressed a preference for decreased expenditures. This is notable because 
it is not just a response to its base but a response to its base in spite of the preferences of the mean 
voter. 
– Figure 6– 
Turning to majority governments, we see again that responsiveness is resistant to poll popularity. 
Responsiveness is statistically significant in the 40 to 50 percent range but very small and negative.  
To confirm that government expenditures respond to being out of equilibrium with mean voter 
and/or governing party preferences, we need to look at the model two results in Table 2. The rate of 
cointegration coefficient is -0.72 and is statistically significant, at the 0.05 significance level. This 
means that government expenditures will increase in a given session to cover 72 percent of the gap in 
the equilibrium between expenditures and preferences.  
The Table 2 results (model two) also give us the short-run effects of preferences on expenditures. 
These are estimates of the immediate change in expenditures due to a change in public preferences. 
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As with the coefficients in the cointegrating equation, we see that the effect of being a minority 
government on the relative responsiveness to the mean voter is positive and statistically significant. It 
is also the case that this effect is mitigated by the popularity of the government as indicated by the 
statistically significant and negative coefficient for the three-way interaction between popularity, 
minority government and relative mean voter preferences. Figure 7 plots the effect of a minority 
government’s short-run responsiveness to the mean voter (holding the preferences of the party base 
constant) and to the party base (holding mean voter preferences constant) at different levels of 
popularity in the polls. We don't present the plots for majority governments as the short-run effects 
are not statistically significant at any level of observed popularity. 
– Figures 7 – 
The first plot in Figure 7 shows that the short-run responsiveness of a minority government to the 
mean voter decreases with popularity. The short-run responsiveness is only really statistically 
significant at the lower levels of popularity (25 to 30 percent). The effect of being a minority 
government, relative to a majority government, drops to zero at about 38.44 percent (95% CI: 35.57, 
41.11). This is, again, around the 40 percent threshold perceived to be necessary for forming a 
majority government. The second plot in Figure 7 shows that the short-run responsiveness of a 
minority government to its party base again increases with popularity. This result is statistically 
significant at the extremes of popularity.  
The evidence from the analysis clearly suggests that minority governments are more responsive to 
the mean voter than majority governments (hypothesis 1). This is true both in terms of the long-run 
equilibrium between expenditures and preferences and the short-run change in expenditures in 
response to changes in preferences. The results also support the theoretical expectation that the 
responsiveness of a minority government to the mean voter relative to their party base declines as it 
gains popularity in the polls (hypothesis 3). It also appears to be the case that the difference in 
responsiveness between minority and majority governments disappears once a minority government 
has approximately 40 percent of the intended vote reported in the polls. 
The results are generally all consistent with our theoretical model. One thing we might have expected 
but did not find is responsiveness by majority governments to their party base, particularly when 
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popular in the polls. And, the responsiveness of the majority government to the mean voter is only 
really statistically significant around 40 percent in the polls when we would have also expected an 
effect at lower levels of popularity. It is always difficult to interpret a null result, as it is possible that 
we simply do not have the power to detect this responsiveness. 
Effectiveness Results 
We use OLS regression to estimate our model of legislative success testing the effects of minority 
versus majority government, government popularity and their interaction and a control for the party 
in government. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
– Table 3 – 
 
We test the residuals for serial correlation, using the Q-test for white noise. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the residuals are white noise, and are therefore free from serial correlation, at the 
0.05 significance level.17 We also test for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity.18 We cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
The estimated coefficient for government popularity is the effect of popularity on the legislative 
effectiveness of majority governments. It is not statistically significant at a 0.05 significance level. This 
suggests that the legislative effectiveness of majority governments is not affected by its standing in 
the polls. The effect of government popularity on the effectiveness of minority governments is the 
sum of the coefficients on government popularity and the government popularity X minority 
interaction. The sum of these coefficients is 0.017 and a Wald test of the hypothesis that the sum of 
these coefficients is zero gives us a test statistic of: F(1, 35) = 10.57. The corresponding P-value is 
0.0025. We can reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero. It would appear that 
the legislative effectiveness of a minority government is improved as its popularity in the polls 
increases.  
 
                                                          
17
 The Q-statistic is 14.63. It is chi-squared(18) distributed with a corresponding P-value of 0.69. 
18
 The test statistic is 3.40. It is chi-squared(4) distributed with a corresponding P-value is 0.49. 
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Figure 8 plots the effect of being a minority government on legislative effectiveness at different levels 
of popularity in the polls. It is clear from this plot that the effect of being a minority government 
declines as the governing parties popularity increases. The estimated point at which a minority 
government is just as effective as majority government is 39.05 percent. 
 
– Figure 8 – 
 
These results are again consistent with our hypotheses. Compared to majority governments, minority 
governments are less legislatively effective (hypothesis 2). This effect does decline with the increasing 
popularity of the minority government (hypothesis 3), to the point that a minority government is just 
as effective as a majority government. This point is approximately 40 percent of vote intention in the 
polls. 
 
Conclusions  
A large number of studies have examined how electoral systems influence government 
responsiveness and effectiveness. Yet, there is still no consensus as to whether one of these qualities 
comes at the expense of the other. In this article, we have focused instead on the dynamic factors 
that influence variation in government responsiveness and legislative effectiveness within systems, 
focusing specifically on government status and standing in the polls.  We have analyzed this using 
unique time-series data from Canada, as this is a case of a majoritarian democracy with frequent 
changes between minority and majority governments. Our findings demonstrate that under a 
minority government, there is indeed a trade-off between responsiveness and effectiveness, and this 
trade-off is conditioned on the popularity of the government. A minority government becomes as 
responsive and legislatively effective as a majority government when it is polling at about 40 per cent 
of vote intention. The advantage of analyzing a single case is we avoid making erroneous inferences 
due to confounding factors – a problem to which a static cross-national study is subject. The 
drawback, of course, is that it is unclear whether the findings can be generalized beyond Canada. 
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While there is still work to be done to test these propositions in other countries, it is worth reiterating 
the significance of our results. Even within a strongly majoritarian system of government, we can see 
the trade-off between responsiveness and effectiveness. At least, we can see it within minority 
governments. The fact that a minority government’s greater responsiveness and lower effectiveness 
is mitigated by its popularity in the polls has an interesting implication. Under a minority government, 
it places the degree of trade-off in the hands of the electorate. If a minority government is perceived 
as being unresponsive and pushing through legislation unwanted by the mean voter, its popularity is 
likely to drop, restricting the government's ability to pass legislation and increasing its incentives to 
become responsive. This suggests that institutions that produce minority governments on a (semi) 
regular basis may actually facilitate responsiveness and representation. These findings also highlight 
the importance of not focusing purely on relatively static institutional factors, such as electoral 
systems and federalism, when evaluating the quality of government, but also focusing on more 
dynamic factors that play a key role in how executives govern. 
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Table 1. Social Welfare Responsiveness Cointegrating Equation 
SW_billions Election Year (E) 2.784 0.718 
  (1.999) (2.438) 
 Gov Party: Liberals (PG) -7.284 -5.907 
  (3.861) (4.291) 
 Unemployment (U) 7.009 4.675 
  (0.683)** (0.961)** 
 Trend (T) 0.129 0.151 
  (0.004)** (0.008)** 
 Minority Government (MIN) -5.843 -536.556 
  (2.728)** (172.221)** 
 Log of Government Popularity  20.011 0.478 
 ln(P) (6.632)** (22.009) 
 Governing Party Base (GP) MIP 1.578 -1.943 
  (1.281) (1.774) 
 Mean Voter (MV) – Governing  4.081 -32.343 
 Party Base (GP) MIP (1.810)** (47.064) 
 Intercept -83.087 5.816 
  (23.768)** (75.926) 
 MIN X (MV – GP)  687.182 
   (179.679)** 
 ln(P) X MIN  146.795 
   (47.138)** 
 ln(P) X (MV – GP)  9.994 
   (12.875) 
 ln(P) X MIN X (MV – GP)  -187.302 
   (49.214)** 
ARMA MA(3) -0.497 -1.000 
  (0.118)** (0.000)** 
N  32 32 
** p<0.05 
 
  
35 
 
Table 2. Social Welfare Responsiveness Error Correction Model 
 ∆SW_billions ∆SW_billions 
Cointegrating Equationt-1 -0.482 -0.734 
 (0.163)** (0.261)** 
∆Election Year (E) 1.184 1.388 
 (1.005) (1.223) 
∆Gov Party – Liberals (PG) -4.968 -6.606 
 (2.654) (3.693) 
∆Unemployment (U) 0.991 0.379 
 (0.911) (1.047) 
∆Minority Government (MIN) -2.065 -228.282 
 (1.801) (120.946) 
Log of Government Popularity  6.101 10.236 
ln(P) (3.672) (10.986) 
∆Governing Party Base (GP) MIP 1.098 -0.105 
 (1.514) (1.668) 
∆Mean Voter (MV) – Governing  -0.785 3.250 
Party Base (GP) MIP (2.395) (24.878) 
∆MIN X (MV – GP)  284.464 
  (132.614)** 
∆ln(P) X MIN  62.444 
  (33.429) 
∆ln(P) X (MV – GP)  -0.665 
  (6.662) 
∆ln(P) X MIN X (MV – GP)  -78.011 
  (36.557)** 
Trend (𝑇) 0.064 0.129 
 (0.097) (0.118) 
Intercept 3.752 3.150 
 (1.926) (2.178) 
R2 0.52 0.54 
N 31 31 
** p<0.05  
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Table 3. Canadian Legislative Effectiveness Model 
 
 Legislative Effectiveness 
Governing Party (PG) -0.044 
 (0.036) 
Government popularity (P) -0.001 
 (0.010) 
Government popularity2 (P2) 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Minority Government (MIN) -5.220 
 (1.215)** 
P X MIN 0.240 
 (0.060)** 
P2 X MIN -0.003 
 (0.001)** 
Constant 0.949 
 (0.192)** 
R2 0.51 
T 40 
** p<0.05 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Government Responsiveness and Effectiveness  
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Figure 2. Government Expenditures on Social Welfare by Parliament and Session, 1965-2009 
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Figure 3. Social Welfare MIP by Parliament and Session, 1965-2009 
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Figure 4. Legislative Effectiveness of the Canadian Federal Government, 1958-2008 
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Figure 5. Long-run Responsiveness to Mean Voter (holding Party Base Constant)  
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Figure 6. Long-run Responsiveness to Party Base (holding Mean Voter Constant)  
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Figure 7.  
Short-run Responsiveness to Mean Voter (holding Party Base Constant)   
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Short-run Responsiveness to Party Base (holding Mean Voter Constant) 
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Figure 8. Effect of Minority Government on Effectiveness 
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